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South Africa’s economic miracle – has the emperor lost his cloths?
“Reconciliation means that those who have been on the underside of 
history must see that there is a qualitative difference […]. I mean, what 
is the point of having made this transition if the quality of life of these 
people is not enhanced  and improved? If not the vote is useless.”
(Tutu, 1999)
3 LR programmes:
•Land Tenure Reform: aiming at (re-)defining and institutionalising all 
existing land tenures
•Land Restitution: people/communities dispossessed after 1913 to 
reclaim their land
•Land Redistribution: people can be allocated subsidies to buy land at 
market price
-SLAG: R16 000/HH
-LRAD: R20 000 to R100 000
(proportional to own contribution going from labour till financial 
contribution of R400 000)
Project: Land restitution and Land Redistribution
1. Land Reform in South Africa: 
Addressing the past – confronting the present
Objective:
Evaluating impact of LR on development
-Multi-level (national, local, HH)
-Multi-criteria (economic, social, political)
Quantitative measures (general/farm level): 
-Number of hectares/Number of beneficiaries
-Economic impact of LR (revenue)
Qualitative measures/aspects (farm/HH/community level)
-Quality of life
-Social impact of LR
Professional/Socio-economic trajectories of beneficiaries
(farm – beneficiary – community assessment)
2. How to address Land Reform?
39 LR projects assessed:
* 5 restitution projects, 16901 ha and officially 3791 HH beneficiaries
* 16 SLAG projects, 8747 ha and officially 1183 HH beneficiaries
* 18 LRAD projects, 4027 hectares and 178 HH beneficiaries
3. Mole-mole’s LR projects
2 communities assessed:
•Makgato
•Sekgopo
4. A first description
* CC2
* No constitution
* No hierarchy – no 
management committee
* Title deed
* Trust
* Elected constitution
* Community elected 
management committee: 
* Title deed
* CPA
* Elected constitution
* Traditional tribal 
hierarchy
* Not always title deed
Legal/ institutional structure
Entire or part of farmEntire or part of farmSeveral farmsType of acquired farm
Seller/Buyer driven
2.3
LRAD grants (% of own 
contribution) + loan
Seller driven
2.9
SLAG grants (# hh
according to price)
Claim (previously 
displaced)
7.8
None
Acquisition procedure
Time to process applications (years)
Financial implications for beneficiaries
* Less far/far
* 1 geographical area
* Limited group
* Less far
* 1 geographical area
* Part community
* Far
* Scattered places
* 1 community
Origin of beneficiaries
7
12
74/26
4
68
338
64/36
6
695
4156
-
-
Average number of HH per project (effectives)
Average number of benef per project 
(effectives)
% Male/Female
% Youth
674 750
5598
774 857
2588
1 325 490
391
Average price per project (Rands)
Average price per ha (Rands)
173
26
540
7.9
3390
4.9
Average area per project (Ha)
Average area/HH (ha/HH)
18165Number of projects
LRADSLAGRestitution
Table : Synthesis of the characteristics of Mole-mole’s land reform projects (restitution, SLAG and LRAD) 
5. A first evaluation
The negative trajectories of the LR projects
Table III.3.: Gross farm income per type of land reform farms 
 
Land reform type Agricultural income 
(Rands) 
Other income 
(Rands) 
Total income 
(Rands) 
Restitution    
Average 0 139600 139600 
St.dev. 0 279823 279823 
Max 0 638000 638000 
Min 0 0 0 
SLAG    
Average 22139 8531 30670 
St.dev. 39435 12272 44548 
Max 141542 13080 143453 
Min 0 0 0 
LRAD    
Average 14444 0 14444 
St.dev. 50361 0 50361 
Max 214000 0 214000 
Min 0 0 0 
Total    
Average 15749 21397 37147 
St.dev. 42416 102111 108642 
Max 214000 638000 638000 
Min 0 0 0 
 
* R37147/121=
R307 HH/y
* 10.5% of the gross
income reference
*Differences in 
income structures
* Differences per        
type of project
5. A first evaluation
Table III.4.: Mole-mole farms per income group 
 
Gross farm income group 
 
R0 
(1st income group) 
R1-R100 000  
(2nd income group) 
100 000 <  
(3rd income group) 
Number of projects    
Total 20 (51.2%) 15 (38.5%) 4 (10.3%) 
Restitution 3 1 1 
SLAG 2 12 2 
LRAD 15 2 1 
Agricultural income (Rands)    
Average 0 11018 112236 
St.dev. 0 10907 89752 
Max 0 26160 214000 
Min 0 0 0 
Other income (Rands)    
Average 0 9763.333 172012 
St.dev. 0 14853.6 311553 
Max 0 60000 638000 
Min 0 0 0 
Total income (Rands)    
Average 0 20781.33 284249 
St.dev. 0 13102.82 238232 
Max 0 60000 638000 
Min 0 5800 141542 
 
* Out of 39, 20 project 
have no income: 2 rest, 
2 SLAG, 16 LRAD (all 
collapsed, except 13 
LRAD never started)
* 15 projects generate 
some income, mixed 
income structures, 
negative spiral
* 4 are maintaining, 
mixed income struct
(not leasing only)
6. The impact of Land Reform
900001494420Min (Rands)
5420007133365000Max. (Rands)
1457831455118810St. dev.
2426001968213590Average (Rands)
R100 000 
<
R1-R100 
000
R0
Gross 
income
reference
Gross income groupGross income per HH
Table III.6.: The gross farm income per household for the different identified 
income groups
•Even in upper income 
group, it remains marginal 
(especially since only 4 
projects)
22.5%100%100%% of official benef
277Average per project
27120120Total effectives
LRAD
11.2%32.6%100.0%% of official benef
82468Average per project
1223571094Total effectives
SLAG
0.4%46.9%100.0%% of official benef.
3422108Average per project
1516333477Total effectives
Restitution
Beneficiaries 
presently benefiting 
from land reform 
projects
Beneficiaries 
effectively engaging 
in land reform projects
Official beneficiaries 
of land reform 
projects
Table III.8.: Beneficiary HH of land reform in Mole-mole per type
Not 4691 HH, but 164 
beneficiary HH!
=3.5%
6. The impact of Land Reform
5. The impact of Land Reform
No, if not negative, impact on quality of life
96.5% of beneficiaries are not engaged
Those who remain engaged where mainly the farm workers, pensioners, 
or investors
(only 43% of the 164 beneficiaries are benefiting)
On contrary,
*70% of the farm workers lost their jobs
*Farm workers: loss of income – working conditions decreased –social 
isolation
*Gross income (LR project/municipal level) decreased by 89.5%
6. Reasons for failures to link land reform to 
development
Reason 1: The unfeasibility of land reform projects
•The difficult economic conditions of farming (IRR is negative)
•The economic unfeasibility of land reform projects
•Unsuitable types of land acquired
-Parts of farm, no basic infrastructure, no water
-Unwillingness of people to settle (to far, to isolated) 
6. Reasons for failures to link land reform to 
development
Reason 2: Not adapted institutional structures at project level
•Power structures, mismanagement and misuse
(internal and external conflicts)
•Not adapted institutional and legal entities
Problem of access to services, mainly financial
Problem of process of decision-making
6. Reasons for failures to link land reform to 
development
Reason 3: Lack of collective action and institutional isolation
Positive correlation between farm income/production and institutional 
links 
(Public, private and associative institutions)
However, very few institutional links
Little effort is made either by the projects themselves or by the 
coordinating institutions 
6. Reasons for failures to link land reform to 
development
Reason 4: Administrative heaviness and lack of transparency
-Average time lapse for claim to be settled: 7.8 years 
-Activities are implemented without consultations or agreement 
-Illegitimate practices
6. Reasons for failures to link land reform to 
development
Reason 5: Insufficient, uncoordinated and not adapted (technical) 
support services
-Decrease of number of technical staff, considering the number of
people to serve
-High turnover of staff (incapacity)
-Unadapted (technical) services 
Different tasks (project management, community management, 
community psychology, alternative dispute resolution, etc.) 
to serve a ‘new type of farmer’
7. Conclusions – the need for an alternative 
development model around land reform?
Negative impact of LR in SA – not new, but quantified!
Solutions to overcome these failures are thus essential
Recommendations linked to the different issues highlighted
•Bases for pre and post-settlement support (SIS)
•Link land to agrarian reform (LARP)
But is this enough?
The need for new development models linked to LR?
Besides other, options are:
•Former homeland-center development
•Rural and non-agricultural activity development
Rethink the role of the different actors (State, private sector, …) and SA 
development trajectory/paradigm 
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